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Substance Dualism Fortified
N. M. L. NATHAN
Introduction
You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you
could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the
immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance
dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they
suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or
wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form
of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not consciousness but
another immaterial feature which is essential to the self, a feature in
one way analogous to a non-dispositional taste. Each self has more-
over a different feature of this general kind. If this is right then
simple and straightforward answers are available to some questions
which prove troublesome to the Cartesian, consciousness-requiring
type of substance dualist. I mean the questions, How can the self
exist in dreamless sleep?, What distinguishes two simultaneously ex-
isting selves, andWhat makes a self the same self as a self which exists
at some other time?
Why not just abandon substance dualism? Why suppose that
the subject of consciousness is anything but corporeal? That is a
question which I leave aside. I focus rather on the options that con-
front us if we do rightly or wrongly assume the subject not to be
corporeal.
Someone will say that my very distinction between the subject and
its consciousness betrays a mistaken view about how in general sub-
stances relate to properties, a failure to appreciate the truth that
Kant enunciates when he maintains that ‘in their relation to sub-
stance, [accidents or properties] are not really subordinated to it,
but are the mode of existence of the subject itself.’1 In the Second
Meditation, Descartes refers to ‘that I know not what of mine which
1 Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Kemp Smith (London:MacMillan, 1964),
B441/A414.
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cannot be pictured in the imagination.’2 According to Galen
Strawson, this shows that Descartes has relapsed into a ‘bad’, non-
Kantian picture of objects and their properties, a picture ‘to which
our minds keep defaulting’,3 a picture, perhaps, in which bare par-
ticulars or propertyless substrata figure as the entities which must
exist in order for properties to be instantiated. In another passage
Descartes says that ‘thought must… be considered as nothing else
than thinking substance itself’.4 Here Strawson thinks that
Descartesmanifests a better attitude, shows that he has achieved a dif-
ficult insight out of which he was nevertheless sometimes hustled ‘by
his critics’ insistence on the conventional metaphysical categories’.5
We are to recognize that as Strawson puts it, ‘the subjectivity is just
the subject’.6 The speculations now to follow about the immaterial
nature of what Descartes refers to as the I know not what of mine
are in fact entirely compatible with Kant’s doctrine about the relation
between substances and properties. It is one thing to be a subject of
consciousness, another to be a subject or substance in the sense just
of something of which properties are predicated. Kant’s is a doctrine
of subjects in the latter sense. It does not licence us to deny the exist-
ence of that to which mental contents are presented. To deny it is to
ignore the phenomenology. Suppose you seem to see a scarlet poppy
and, straight afterwards, you are aware of having had this experience.
Then you remember its content: it was an experience as of a scarlet
poppy. But it may well be that you seem also to remember a some-
thing, distinct from this content, to which the content was presented.
‘…When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any-
thing but the perception.’7 Contrary to what Hume says, you may
2 Philosophical Writings, tr. Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), II, 20. As Justin
Broackes points out (‘Substance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
106 (2006), 158 n.30), ‘that I know not what of mine’ is a closer translation
of istud nescio quid mei than the CSM phrase ‘this puzzling “I”’.
3 Galen Strawson, ‘What is the relation between an experience, the
subject of the experience, and the content of the experience?’ Philosophical
Issues, 13 (2003), 308.
4 Philosophical Writings, I, 215.
5 Strawson ‘what is the relation between an experience…’, 313.
6 Ibid., 308
7 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978) Treatise, 252.
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at least seem to catch something other than ‘the perception’, seem to
discern the subject of this perception, and this even though you seem
to discern it only with the perception. As with experiencing, so with
thinking and with willing: as well as remembering the content of the
episode, that which was thought or willed, you may seem to remem-
ber the subject of the episode, that which thought or willed.
Ipseities
What then are selves, according to the non-Cartesian substance
dualist? They are immaterial, in the sense of not spatially extended.
An alternative criterion of immateriality is supplied by the principle
that a feature is material if and only if it is one to his possession of
which the possessor has no privileged access.8 I abjure that criterion
because I want to leave open the possibility that selves have neither
privileged nor unprivileged epistemic access to them as they are in
themselves, and can but speculate about their noumenal nature. If
they have no such epistemic access then on the alternative criterion
of immateriality no selves would be immaterial.
Next I suggest that each self has a property which is intrinsic, in the
sense of non-relational and non-dispositional. If selves are immater-
ial, the intrinsic property will not be one which requires its possessor
to be spatially extended. Examples of intrinsic properties are non-
dispositional tastes and colours. An apple is sweet if it tastes sweet
when tasted under normal conditions. ‘Sweet’ is here used twice:
once in the phrase ‘is sweet’, and once in the phrase ‘tastes sweet’.
In ‘is sweet’, ‘sweet’ stands for a dispositional property. But in
‘tastes sweet’, ‘sweet’ is used in a non-dispositional sense. It is
indeed impossible to define a dispositional taste property except in
terms of its non-dispositional counterpart. Only in terms of non-
dispositional taste properties can we fully describe the contents of
taste experiences. There are in the sameway non-dispositional proper-
ties of colour. If something has a non-dispositional colour then it is
spatially extended, and this remains true even on what may be the
8 Cf. Richard Swinburne ‘FromMental/Physical Identity to Substance
Dualism’ in Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons
Human andDivine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 143: ‘amental property
is one to whose instantiation the substance in whom it is instantiated necess-
arily has privileged access on all occasions of its instantiation, and a physical
property is one to whose instantiation the substance necessarily has no pri-
vileged access on any occasion of its instantiation.’
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false assumption that only contents of experience have such proper-
ties. Even coloured sense data have spatial properties. But something
can have a non-dispositional taste without being spatially extended,
and the intrinsic properties of immaterial selves are I suggest analo-
gous to non-dispositional tastes.
Finally, I suggest that the intrinsic property of each immaterial self
is unshared: no two entities both have it. If by a property is meant a
universal, something which if instantiated has many instances, is
shared by many owners, then there are no unshared properties. But
by a property I mean just a feature. A property is unshared if just
one entity has it, either contingently, as the moon has the property
of being a natural satellite of the earth, or necessarily, as 3 has the
property of being an integer that equals 2+ 1. Each self’s intrinsic
property is, I conjecture, contingently unshared. Someone may
object that if a self possesses an intrinsic property with which experi-
ence acquaints it then that self will share the property with the entity
which is the content of the experience. Is ‘entity’ the right word?Why
not? Experiences have objects. But they also have contents: their
objects are presented to the subject in a certain way. Their objects
may be non-existent but it is hard to deny existence to their contents.
Let me then meet the objection by weakening the definition of being
contingently unshared: a property is contingently unshared if is con-
tingently true that it is possessed by one and only one entity which is
not a mental content.
I need a label for these immaterial, intrinsic, taste-like, unshared
properties. I will call them ipseities. And now we can speculate that
there are substances of a kind for membership of which it is necessary
and sufficient for a substance to have an ipseity. For as the non-
Cartesian substance dualist speculates, selves are just such sub-
stances. They are substances to which ipseities are essential, and
consciousness not essential. All subjects of consciousness will then
be selves. But it is not necessary to suppose that all selves are subjects
of consciousness. A self may often function as such a subject, may
often think or will or have experiences. And sometimes, after it has
thus functioned, it may seem to remember doing so. But it is not es-
sential to a self that it is conscious. Nor is that essential even to a
human self: a human self can be defined with maximum latitude as
one which either has or has at some time had a human body and
which either is or has at some time been conscious.
A further speculation. Though ipseities are unshared, it need not
be denied that there are qualitative resemblances between them.
Imagine a hue with just one instance. It has, in this one instance, a
discernible degree of brightness and a discernible degree of
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saturation. Since the hue has just one instance, the degrees of bright-
ness and of saturation are discernible only by comparison with in-
stances of other hues. Though ipseities are more closely analogous
to non-dispositional tastes than to non-dispositional colours, may
not two or more ipseities agree or differ in a way analogous to that
in which two uniquely instantiated huesmay differ in point of bright-
ness or saturation? That possibility is not excluded by our inability to
discern such gradations by comparing different ipseities. It is poss-
ible then that John’s ipseity is in some degree affected by what he
has done and thought and experienced, and that Mary’s different
ipseity is similarly affected to the same or to a different degree.
Two ipseities may, one might say, be equally or unequally stained
or clarified by what their selves have done or undergone.
And there is another way in which ipseities can resemble each
other. Imagine three hues, each with just one instance. Call these
hues A, B, and C. A may resemble B more than it resembles C, as
for example, in the case of ordinary shared hues, red resembles
orange more than it resembles blue. In the same way, that ipseities
are unshared features does not prevent my ipseity from resembling
yours more than it resembles his, or prevent mine from being more
like yours than either is to anyone else’s. There can in this way be
special affinities between different selves.9
9 That there are weak or strong resemblances between different ipseities
is a thought which may perhaps help the Christian theologian. If he is
willing to adopt a so-called social theory of the Trinity, and say that each
divine Person is a distinct self, he will be able to say that each Person has
an ipseity which resembles the ipseity of the other two Persons vastly
much more than the ipseity of any Person resembles that of any non-
divine self.
And then there is the Freudian, who comes under some pressure to admit
that the human person is composed of more selves than one. ‘We must dis-
tinguish our own consciousness from that of our own alert or drowsy ego.
For doesn’t our ego consciously repress ideas? And how can it do so
without being conscious of those which are dangerously erotic? Since our
consciousness fails to register the harmful ideas and our ego’s repressive be-
haviour, it follows there are two separate arenas of consciousness within us –
our ego’s and our own.’ (Irving Thalberg, ‘Freud’s anatomies of the self’, in
Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (eds.) Philosophical Essays on Freud
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 257) Substance dualists
believe that you have just one soul or self which is essential to your existence.
Perhaps it is possible to diminish the gap between substance dualism and the
multiple selves interpretation of psychoanalytic theory by saying that the




Selves have ipseities, but does any self have experience as of having a
particular quality which is in fact its own ipseity, and which it can
somehow know to be its own ipseity? Is it indeed possible for one
self somehow to gain acquaintance with the ipseity of another self,
and to know that it has gained this acquaintance?
The first question is phenomenological. Go back to the scarlet
poppy. You seem to see it and, straight afterwards, you are aware of
having had this experience. You remember the content of the experi-
ence: it was an experience as of a scarlet poppy. But you seem also to
remember a something, distinct from this content, to which the
content was presented. How does this something present itself?
Just as an indeterminate or hazy object? Or as something with a defi-
nite particular intrinsic quality? Only in the latter case could experi-
ence acquaint you with a quality which was in fact also the particular
ipseity which belongs to you as you are in yourself. But even in the
latter case it would be a further step to claim that you know, directly
or otherwise, that the experienced quality is an unshared quality
which belongs to you as you are in yourself. I see no reason to
think that you could gain such knowledge.
However we answer the first question, the second question must
I think be answered in the negative. A divine self would doubtless
have knowledge of the ipseities of all selves. A mystic might
glimpse the ipseity of a divine self. But human selves are not thus
open to each other, at least this side of the grave. A human self
could not in the natural way of things even gain acquaintance with
a quality which is experienced by another self and which may for
all that other self knows be its own ipseity.
Has anyone thought that experience acquaints each self with the
particular quality which is in fact the ipseity of that self? Gerard
Manley Hopkins seems to have believed as much. Of his ‘selfbeing’
Hopkins wrote that it had a taste ‘more distinctive than the taste of
ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut-leaf or
camphor’. This taste was ‘incommunicable by any means to any
other man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself What must it
be like to be someone else?) Nothing else in nature comes near this
unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this self-
being of my own. Nothing explains or resembles it, except so far as
each other more than any of them resemble any of the ipseities of the selves
which compose another person.
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this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling.’10 Perhaps,
if we are inclined to think that the subject presents itself to memory
just as a hazy or indeterminate something, we should reflect that
the seeming indeterminacy may be a product just of overfamiliarity.
Or perhaps it is a product of the fact that, as Hopkins put it, ‘search-
ing nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being.’11 We
are unable, in the case of the experienced qualities which could be our
ipseities, to experience contrasts between different qualities of that
general kind. The taste of ale is salient just because I can contrast it
with the taste of alum; scarlet is salient because I can contrast it
with dark blue. If no self can in the natural way of things experience
the putatively ipseical quality which another self experiences, then no
self can experience a contrast between the two qualities. But even if
Hopkins is right about the determinacy of the quality you experience
when you seem to experience yourself as a subject, he does nothing to
show that this quality is an ipseity possessed by yourself as you are in
yourself. Whatever its theoretical advantages and pragmatic attrac-
tions the ipseical form of substance dualism remains a speculation.
Consciousness and Identity
What theoretical advantages? On the Cartesian version of substance
dualism, a self must think or will or have experiences: it is an essen-
tially conscious substance. From this it follows that selves are con-
scious whenever they exist. How then can a self enjoy dreamless
sleep? To meet this difficulty, you might follow Descartes and
deny that there is any such thing as dreamless sleep: during sleep
we always dream, even if we cannot always subsequently remember
doing so.12 Another possibility would be to say that selves ‘… exist
in a time-order different from that in which they are deemed to
have periods of unconsciousness’, and that ‘although they may be
said to undergo periods of unconsciousness by virtue of intermit-
tently participating in physical time, they are, in their own time-
order, essentially conscious’.13 Or you might insist that, though
10 Gerard Manley Hopkins, Sermons and Devotional Writings, ed.
C. Devlin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 123.
11 Hopkins, op.cit., 123.
12 Letter to P. Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, Oeuvres et Lettres, Pleiade ed.
1142.
13 Howard Robinson, ‘The Self and Time’ in Van Inwagen and
Zimmerman, op. cit., 57.
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persistent and conscious whenever they exist, selves have an existence
which is intermittent: sometimes they stop existing and then start
again.14 Suppose however that selves are taken not as substances
which are essentially conscious, but rather as substances to which ip-
seities are essential. Then the difficulty does not arise. The self con-
tinues to exist, with its own ipseity, even when it is not conscious.
And so long as it has at some time been conscious and has at some
time had a human body, it continues to exist as a human self: if
there are selves which will have but do not yet have bodies and
which will be but are not yet conscious then these selves will be but
are not yet human.
What distinguishes two simultaneously existing selves? What
makes an earlier self the same self as a later self? These questions
are troublesome to the Cartesian kind of substance dualist. Is it not
possible for two simultaneously existing selves to have thoughts or
volitions or experiences with intrinsically indistinguishable contents,
and for the same body to be shared by two simultaneously existing
selves or by an earlier and a later self? It may be suggested that an
earlier self is the same self as a later self if and only if all the mental
episodes of which the earlier self is the subject belong to the same
set of conscious episodes as those of which the later self is the
subject. But what makes for a single set of conscious episodes?
Causal relations between the episodes? Resemblances between the
contents of their episodes? Both criteria may have the paradoxical
consequence that an earlier self is the same self as two different
later selves. There is an enormous literature about such difficulties.
But on the ipseical version of substance dualism, it can be said
quite simply that two simultaneously existing selves are distinguished
by their different ipseities, and that an earlier self is the same as a later
self if and only if the later self has the same ipseity.
It is worth comparing the doctrine that two simultaneously exist-
ing selves are distinguished by their different ipseities with what
Richard Swinburne has to say about the individuation of human
souls. Swinburne is a substance dualist for whom it is essential to a
human soul that it has some mental property, where a mental prop-
erty ‘is one to whose instantiation the substance in whom it is instan-
tiated necessarily has privileged access on all occasions of its
instantiation’.15 He also thinks that souls have thisness, in the sense
14 Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, rev. ed. 1997), 177: ‘…there seems to me nothing contra-
dictory in allowing to a substance many beginnings of existence.’
15 Swinburne ‘FromMental/Physical Identity to SubstanceDualism’, 143
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that they are exempt from the principle that diverse entities have
different properties. Souls, he believes, ‘just differ solo numero’.16 It
is true that if, as Swinburne thinks, properties are universals, entities
with several instances, then on ipseical substance dualism two simul-
taneously existing selves need not have different properties. But two
such selves do not on this doctrine just differ solo numero: they differ
rather in their contingently unshared, non-dispositional features, in
their ipseities. Each self has its own mysterious feature, in the
natural way of things hidden both from itself and form other selves,
open only to analogical speculation, but a positive feature, richer
than amere numerical identity. But perhaps I exaggerate the austerity
of Swinburne’s view. He does to some extent favour the view that
souls or subjects of consciousness are substances which can exist on
their own as individual essences, and he conjectures that an individual
essence is what Duns Scotus meant by a haecceity or contraction of a
specific form.17 Perhaps this takes him closer than at first appears to
the ipseical form of substance dualism.
According to the substance dualist, your body could be and
perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul
or self. On the ipseical theory the self is not essentially conscious
and could survive the body even if human consciousness requires a
functioning brain. Could there be value in the survival of a non-
conscious self? This is just one of the many questions which now
suggest themselves but into which this paper will not enter. Here
though to end with are some brief remarks on selves as agents.
Agency
Selves are praised or blamed neither for the thoughts which strike
them nor for the experiential contents which are presented to them.
But they are praised or blamed for their volitions, for their decisions
and other acts of will. For this to be appropriate there must be a
relation between the self and its volitions which does not hold
between the self and its thinking or between the self and its experien-
cing, a relation which cannot therefore be completely captured just by
saying that when the self wills something it has a property of willing.
The self must somehow be the origin of its volitions, in a way that it is
16 Swinburne The Evolution of the soul, 333.




not the origin of its thoughts or experiences. What can this mean?
Some philosophers have suggested that for the self to be the origin
of volition is for it to be that volition’s cause: here, if not elsewhere,
causation is a relation not between events but between a substance
and an event. This is hard to understand. What is the difference
between the self’s causing its volition, and its being true that the
self exists and has a property of willing? We do not seem to have
any experience of such a causal relation. Certainly one can be aware
of willing, and sometimes one knows that one’s willing is effective.
But when one wills one does not seem to be aware of any causal
relation between oneself and one’s willing.
Two thoughts suggest themselves. The first takes a hint from
Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries. ‘Substance of a Spirit is that
it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble
yt may be made on ye word it) to act, cause, will, operate.’18
Suppose you remember deciding to climb up Whernside. Then
you seem to remember not just your self, the decider, and the
content of your decision, but also a third, volitional element, which
we can call a force. In the case of thinking or experiencing there
are by contrast just two elements, the self and the presented
mental content. But is there really a pre-existing self which is
distinct from and yet simultaneous with the force, and which, as
well as deciding, is aware of the force and the content of the decision?
Why not say rather that the force, for as long as it exists, takes over
the thinking and experiencing functions of the self, together with
the self’s ipseity? The self, though it sometimes exists without
being conscious, and sometimes functions as a subject of thought
or experience, never itself functions as an agent. When the force
starts, the self ceases to exist, and when the force stops, the self is
reborn. Our praise and blame can be directed to the force itself, not
to a pre-existing self by which the force is somehow mysteriously
originated.
The other and less radical thought is this. It was earlier conjectured
that an ipseity may as it were be more or less stained or clarified by
what the self has done or undergone, just as a given hue may be
present with a greater or lesser degree of brightness or of saturation.
May it not be that before a self wills there is an unobservable heigh-
tening, in some dimension, of the ipseity of that self, and that the
willing is in fact caused by that heightening? On this view of
18 Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries in A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop
(eds.), The works of George Berkeley (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1948–57), 829.
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things, the self originates its volition and is responsible for it not
because the volition is caused by the substance which is the self,
but because it is caused by an event which is an intensification of
the essential feature of the substance which is the self.
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